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ABSTRACT  
Much of the evidence translation literature focuses narrowly on the use of evidence in the initial policy 
formulation stages, and downplays the crucial role of institutions and the inherently political nature of 
policy making. More recent approaches acknowledge the importance of institutional and political factors, 
but make no attempt to incorporate their influence into new models of evidence translation. To address 
this issue, this article uses data from a comparative case study of bowel cancer screening policy in 
Australia, the United Kingdom and New Zealand, to propose alternative models of evidence 
incorporation which apply to all stages of the policy process. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
This article presents findings from a comparative case study of bowel cancer screening policy in three 
nations – Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom (UK) – and makes an argument for wider use 
of deliberative mechanisms to incorporate the role of evidence and politics in health policy making. 
There is solid evidence from meta-analysis of randomised controlled trials of faecal occult blood test 
(FOBT) screening that biennial screening can reduce the relative risk of dying from bowel cancer by up 
to 25% (Hewitson et al, 2007). Government agencies in all three nations reviewed the same high-quality 
evidence from earlier studies, and the UK and Australian governments began implementing national 
bowel cancer screening programmes in 2006, although the programmes were implemented in very 
different ways. New Zealand began a pilot bowel cancer screening programme in 2011 and no decision 
on implementation will be made until 2014. 
The focus of this article is on the role of institutional and political factors in evidence-based programme 
implementation in each case study. It is a further development of an earlier model, based on an 
examination of how evidence was used in bowel cancer screening policy in Australia (Flitcroft et al, 
2011a). We begin debate by briefly discussing the role of evidence, politics, institutions and the public in 
policy making, and then outline the emerging evidence translation literature. 
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This background sets the scene for our subsequent arguments about the need to incorporate theoretical 
ideas about evidence translation with practical policy implementation issues in order to increase the use 
of evidence in the policy process. We then propose three deliberative models that may be useful in 
institutionalising the use of evidence beyond the policy formulation stages. 
 
BACKGROUND 
Evidence and the policy process 
Approaches to evidence in policy making have displayed a marked divide between technical and 
contextualised definitions. The former, internalist approaches, rely on formal procedures based on 
hierarchies of evidence to guarantee quality, with the randomised controlled trial at its apex. In contrast 
the more contextualised approach stresses the external relationships which shape evidence as ‘the 
temporal and contextual variation heavily influence the determination of what constitutes evidence’ 
(Dobrow, Goel, and Upshur 2004, 209). From this perspective, the relevance of evidence takes 
precedence over its quality. Head (2008, 1) describes three different types of evidence – systematic 
(‘scientific’) research, programme management experience (‘practice’) and political judgement. He 
argues that ‘these disparate bodies of knowledge become multiple sets of evidence that inform and 
influence policy rather than determine it’. Majone (1989, 10) takes a different approach again, arguing 
that ‘evidence is not synonymous with data or information. It is information selected from the available 
stock and introduced at a specific point in the argument in order to persuade a particular audience of the 
truth or falsity of a statement’. Evidence can be most persuasive when aligned with current political 
realities or priorities (Nutbeam and Boxall, 2008). 
The role of evidence in policy making is complex. The type of evidence used in different stages of 
decision making varies (Dobrow et al, 2006). Furthermore, different stakeholders may assign different 
values to particular types of evidence. For example, policy-making civil servants are attracted to 
evidence that fits with existing beliefs and is free from uncertainties (Stevens, 2011), while politicians 
may rely most on political evidence, professionals on scientific evidence, and programme managers on 
practical evidence – although all are intrinsically linked (Head, 2008). Evidence can be used for different 
purposes (Weiss, 1979) and terms such as ‘evidence informed’ or ‘evidence aware’ are favoured by 
some researchers to the traditional term ‘evidence based’, in recognition of the fact that evidence is 
rarely, if ever, the major determinant of policy (Nutley, 2003). The difficulty of getting evidence into policy 
and practice has given rise to a vast literature intended to promote better informed policy decisions. 
Policy and politics 
Policy refers to the broad goals, objectives and frameworks in which activity takes place. This article is 
concerned with health policy decisions at a national level. Politics is fundamentally concerned with the 
processes that govern broader allocative choices: in Lasswell’s terms (1936), ‘who gets what, when and 
how’ through non-market distribution of scarce resources by the state. Decisions to invest in health (as 
opposed to education or defence) draw on values well beyond the intrinsic merits of a particular 
intervention, however well substantiated. Budgetary priority setting will incorporate other less concrete 
forms of evidence such as programme experience, cultural perceptions and judgements of political and 
electoral support (Lin and Gibson, 2003; Head, 2008). Resource allocation decisions are usually not 
transparent, and are often heavily influenced by institutional and political factors. 
Politics provides an essential bridge between evidence and policy (Gamble and Stone, 2006). While 
research evidence can inform policy debate, identifying issues and potential solutions, policy 
implementation depends on broader political choices between a range of different possible solutions to a 
problem. 
Institutions 
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Twenty years ago, leading political scientists commented that ‘one of the most surprising – and 
distressing – aspects of the literature on knowledge utilisation is that its development has been largely 
independent of the literature in political science on the factors affecting the policy process’ (Jenkins-
Smith and Sabatier, 1993, 5). Such factors include the crucial role of institutions (Flitcroft et al, 2011a) 
and the inherently political nature of policy making (Nutley et al, 2002). 
Policy choices, especially around implementation, are shaped and limited by institutions, as March and 
Olsen’s (2006) classic definition emphasises:  
An institution is a relatively enduring collection of rules and organized practices, embedded in structures 
of meaning and resources that are relatively invariant in the face of turnover of individuals and relatively 
resilient to the idiosyncratic preferences and expectations of individuals and changing external 
circumstance. (2006, 3) 
Institutions, such as the legislative, judicial and executive arms of government, the electoral system and 
the bureaucracy ‘shape preferences, beliefs, norms, and emotions’ (Rueschemeyer, 2009, 204). They 
provide the setting in which policies are determined, from policy formulation through to policy 
implementation. Table 1 shows a simplified version of the stages of the policy process – in reality, policy 
making is less linear, and more complex than this table suggests, with evidence entering at one end, a 
‘black box’ of policy process in the middle (involving competition of norms and interests within and 
between institutions) and policy outcomes exiting the other end. 
The public and policy 
As Table 1 shows, the public is far removed from the standard policy process. Deliberative democracy 
advocates argue for more participative, democratic and bottom-up approaches to policy development 
(Nutley et al, 2007). They aim to canvass the range of possible views on a policy issue, distribute the 
decision-making authority and encourage increased communication about how policy decisions are 
made (Hajer, Laws and Versteeg, 2009). The premise here is such institutional change would allow 
‘more effective engagement by researchers with ordinary citizens [and] could have a powerful impact on 
decision making by influencing public knowledge and attitudes and, in turn, the politician’s perception of 
the “saleability” of particular initiatives’ (Grayson, 2007, 15). 
Table 1: Stages of the policy process  
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EVOLUTION OF EVIDENCE TRANSLATION THEORIES 
The mainstream evidence translation literature (which includes the knowledge transfer and knowledge 
transfer and exchange models) has traditionally focused on the initial phase of translating evidence into 
policy recommendations: the identification of policy problems and potential workable solutions. 
However, the analysis rarely goes beyond this preliminary phase of transferring evidence into the hands 
of policy makers (usually bureaucrats in the first instance). The later stages involving the actual 
implementation of evidence-based proposals are more difficult, as they involve wider policy issues, such 
as the allocation of sufficient resources (money, workforce, facilities) and the weighing up of alternatives 
and opportunity costs that are often not directly commensurable. 
Although the more recent implementation science literature discusses issues that arise in the 
implementation stage, it has a practice, rather than policy, focus. For example, the Consolidated 
Framework for Implementation Research focuses on getting clinical research findings into individual 
medical clinic practices (Damschroder et al, 2009). Furthermore, a systematic review of implementation 
science studies acknowledged that it ‘was not designed to tap centrally into the literature on 
policymaking and its impact’ (Greenhalgh et al, 2004, 610). Similarly, Best et al (2008) talk about 
knowledge integration, but their work is focused on the organisational level and stresses the importance 
of networks and communication. 
Both policy makers and researchers acknowledge that many other factors impact on the way evidence 
is filtered, shaped or rejected (Gibson, 2003; Davies, 2004; Nutley et al, 2007) including institutional 
sources of expertise such as political strategies used to build coalitions of support, and professional 
experience of programme delivery (Head, 2010). Yet the role of institutions and politics continues to be 
downplayed in emerging evidence translation theories. 
For example, despite readily acknowledging the complexity of decision making and the ‘organisational 
and political factors with which research knowledge must compete to influence the decision-making 
process’ (Lavis et al, 2003, 225), recent evidence translation theories have not developed methods for 
integrating this complexity into their analysis. The ‘knowledge to action’ (KTA) approach advocates a 
‘systems model’ methodology, recognising that ‘KTA activities are embedded within the structure of a 
system and the factors that influence the system require attention if changes are to be made that go 
beyond the superficial’ (Best et al, 2009, 637). Yet at most, such approaches add implementation 
analysis to the initial policy transfer, moving beyond simple information transfer to offering more detailed 
‘guidance’ – again at the start of the policy process – rather than recognising that there is a need for 
some serious reforms of how policy is implemented to improve the transparency of the evidence 
translation process. (Bosch-Capblanch et al, 2012). 
This article aims to move evidence translation theory to the next level, by incorporating practical policy 
implementation issues into an institutional approach to evidence translation. Sanderson (2010; 2011) 
recognised the potential advantages for evidence-based policy of a more deliberative approach to policy 
formulation. He proposed the normative notion of ‘intelligent government’ defined as incorporating ‘our 
best available social scientific evidence, the practice wisdom of those who are experienced in dealing 
with social problems ‘on the ground’ and the ‘common sense’ of those who experience such problems’ 
(Sanderson, 2010, 75). Like Sanderson, we believe that greater transparency and a more inclusive 
approach to decision making – through the use of deliberative mechanisms – is the key to producing 
more evidence informed policy outcomes. 
METHODOLOGY 
Methods 
Document analysis and key informant interviews were used for this comparative case study. Details of 
the three individual cases and their specific methods is available elsewhere: Australia (Flitcroft et al, 
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2010); New Zealand (Flitcroft et al, 2011b); and the UK (Flitcroft et al, 2011c). Ethics approval for this 
project was granted by the Human Research Ethics Committee of the University of Sydney (Approval 
no. 05- 2007/9971).  
FINDINGS 
Australia: the filtering of evidence 
The Australian case study identified a range of institutional and political processes that worked to filter 
the evidence about bowel cancer screening (Flitcroft et al, 2010). The Australian National Health and 
Medical Research Council (NHMRC), a government funded statutory authority, reviewed and followed 
expert opinion, recommending biennial FOBT screening for those aged over 50 (NHMRC, 1999). In 
2004, the Howard government made an election commitment to fund a full screening programme, in line 
with the NHMRC’s recommendations. This commitment was made possible by a substantial federal 
budget surplus which removed potential fiscal barriers to full implementation. However, a range of 
political and institutional factors combined around the time of the 2004 federal election campaign to 
derail this opportunity. 
These factors included institutional issues such as: the Australian Department of Health and Ageing’s 
close control over the supposedly independent expert evidence review process; the role of non-elected 
ministerial advisors, employed by the governing political party, who lacked the content expertise of the 
independent experts, but who had substantial influence over election campaigns; the lack of 
communication between government departments, resulting in inaccurate costings for the proposed 
programme; and an inflexible whole of government Expenditure Review Committee allocation process 
that prevented the allocation of further funding (Flitcroft et al, 2010). 
The government supervised evidence review took place within a culture of minimal transparency: the 
experts advising the government were prevented from discussing publicly the issues raised at these 
meetings by confidentiality clauses; committee minutes were not made publicly available; and many of 
the research reports that were commissioned by the government (and paid for by the taxpayers) were 
never published. When research reports were published, bureaucratic delays resulted in them not being 
made available until after decisions they were meant to inform had already been made. 
A process that had commenced with the direct transfer of evidence into policy proposals became lost in 
a welter of well-meaning bureaucratic and political decision making. Governments were able to present 
their watered down versions of screening policy as if they were a logical and necessary staged 
implementation process, when in reality there would have been enough funding and colonoscopy 
resources to implement a full programme, as recommended by the NHMRC, had the political and 
institutional impediments not existed. 
All of these factors combined to result in a less than ideal policy outcome. Compromise is the stuff of 
policy making, but in this case as the programme advanced through the policy process, the 
underpinning evidence became less important than saving face in the wake of inaccurate costings and 
an inflexible approach to resource allocation. The Howard government only funded bowel cancer 
screening for people aged 55 and 65 years of age. The subsequent Rudd government added 50 year 
olds to the screening programme, and the current Gillard government has since promised to extend the 
screening programme to those aged 60 and 70 years of age. When this happens, Australia will offer 
screening at five yearly intervals rather than the biennial intervals suggested by the evidence. The 
Cancer Council of Australia advocated this compromise position, in order to secure a commitment to 
ongoing funding beyond the next budgetary cycle, and the government has announced plans to extend 
the programme to biennial screening from 2017–18. However, under this plan, full biennial screening will 
not be achieved until 2034, well beyond the lifespan of the current government. There is no guarantee 
that subsequent governments will adhere to this promise. 
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New Zealand: cultural and ethical interpretations of evidence 
In New Zealand proposals for an evidence-based bowel cancer screening programme were deferred, 
despite New Zealand having the highest age-standardised rate of bowel cancer mortality worldwide. 
A lack of colonoscopy capacity was identified as the major issue for the New Zealand government’s 
decision to delay the implementation of a bowel cancer screening programme. It was a sensible 
decision given a 2007 survey of public hospital capacity (Yeoman and Parry, 2007) revealed that public 
facilities could not cope with the demand for symptomatic and surveillance colonoscopies, and lacked 
spare capacity for additional colonoscopies generated by positive FOBTs on asymptomatic, average risk 
individuals. 
However, resource constraints also reflect decisions about priorities. A closer look at the New Zealand 
situation reveals other important barriers to the initiation of a bowel cancer screening programme 
(Flitcroft et al, 2011b). These included the symbolic part played by the 1840 Treaty of Waitangi in 
contemporary New Zealand public policy. This treaty mandated participation of New Zealand’s 
traditional owners, the Maori, in policy decisions, Maori partnership in service delivery and the principle 
of protection and improvement of Maori health status. This in turn meant that a one-size-fits-all approach 
to bowel cancer screening would not be acceptable in New Zealand as the needs of its Maori citizens 
required special consideration. At a societal level, there was concern that a bowel cancer screening 
programme could increase the existing health inequalities between the European-descent majority and 
the Maori and other ethnic minorities if, as expected, they had lower participation rates in the screening 
programme. 
New Zealand also has a history of adverse events, including deaths, linked to failure to follow up 
positive screening tests in its cervical and breast cancer screening programmes. Public inquiries were 
held into these failures, so proposals for a new screening programme had to satisfy expectations that 
the benefits of the programme would clearly outweigh its potential for harm to the individual participating 
in the programme. 
The impact of these cultural and ethical issues was elevated as government showed little leadership in 
guiding this issue through to a policy outcome. Policy makers faced conflicting advice from a multitude 
of advisory bodies, representing a mix of professional, bureaucratic and patient advocates, about how 
best to implement a bowel cancer screening programme; and this indecision was compounded by a 
disruptive restructuring of the Ministry of Health, breaking institutional memory and policy continuities. 
These cultural and institutional limits were exposed when the Minister for Health decided to act 
unilaterally. In 1998, pressure from a well-known journalist and an upcoming national election led to a 
shock announcement by the Minister for Health that New Zealand would implement a full bowel cancer 
screening programme over an unrealistic and remarkably short timeframe. This announcement exposed 
the deeper policy problems, with Ministry of Health staff floundering to find the necessary resources. 
The governing party lost the 1998 election and the prevailing caution was quickly reinstituted by the new 
Minister for Health. 
The United Kingdom: evidence, independence and pragmatism 
In Britain, the review of evidence for screening programmes is not undertaken by government, but is 
delegated to a permanent advisory body: the UK-wide National Screening Committee (NSC). The NSC 
is responsible for reviewing evidence and providing advice on the development of, and changes to, all 
health screening programmes to the four UK governments. NSC recommendations are taken seriously 
by government – to the extent that the then Prime Minister Gordon Brown promised that ‘wherever they 
recommend a new form of screening on clinical grounds, we will make it available to everyone’ (UK 
Screening Portal, 2012). It comprises academics, clinicians, civil servants and user representatives, and 
it undertook a thorough and public review of the evidence for bowel cancer screening. 
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Following this extensive evaluation, the NSC only recommended implementation of biennial FOBT 
screening across the UK for 60–69 year olds, with older people able to opt in. It did not include 
screening for those in their 50s, despite the pilot studies including those aged 50–69 years, and did not 
match the recommendation from the Council of the European Union (Council of the European Union, 
2003) which advocated biennial FOBT screening for all those aged 50–74. Scotland chose to follow the 
European recommendation rather than the more limited NSC recommendation (Flitcroft et al, 2011c). 
The NSC decision to begin rolling out a screening programme to people in their 60s was taken ‘in order 
to achieve full national coverage with available and expanding capacity’ (National Health Service, 2007, 
2). This statement indicates that the NSC was aware of, and took into account, the limitations faced by 
UK governments in terms of colonoscopy capacity and the need to train more colonoscopy doctors and 
nurses to meet increased demand. If a screening body at arm’s length from the government considers 
not purely the evidence, but also the resource implications, when making its recommendations, it 
relieves pressure on the government to take a more evidence-based approach, and de-politicises the 
policy decisions around resource allocation. 
DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS FOR PRACTICE 
From this comparative case study analysis, we have identified a lack of evidence incorporation in the 
policy process. Inadequate or delayed implementation of the screening programmes was not due to a 
lack of evidence about their effectiveness or efficacy. Nor was it due solely to limited resources, 
although this limitation was important in New Zealand and the UK. 
More important, in each of these cases, was the politically-framed allocative decision, based on policy 
priorities. Evidence transfer was focused at the start of the policy process – but there was decreasing 
opportunity for expert, stakeholder or public feedback during the vital phases of policy formation and 
resource allocation. 
So what are the implications of these findings for evidence-based policy? ‘Policy decisions emerge from 
politics, judgement and debate, rather than being deduced from empirical analysis’ (Head, 2008, 1). The 
production, or even coproduction by researchers and policy makers, of evidence-based materials and/or 
arguments is not necessarily sufficient to ensure that evidence is given due consideration once the 
institutional and political manoeuvrings around funding for programme implementation come into play. 
The careful weighing of relevant scientific evidence during policy formulation is often replaced by 
practical value-based assessments and trading-off of different priorities in the implementation stage. 
The ‘evidence’ needed for implementation goes far beyond scientific research findings to encompass 
the resources and system capacities necessary for success. Hence, the range of acceptable evidence 
needs to be expanded beyond concepts of efficacy (will it work?), effectiveness (will it work here?), and 
cost-effectiveness (will it work here for a reasonable cost?), to include more contextual factors such as: 
practical feasibility (will it work here with the available resources?); political feasibility (will it be 
supported by the decision makers?); organisational acceptability (will it be supported by the programme 
managers and service providers charged with delivering it?); and end user acceptability (will it be 
supported by the people it is designed for?). 
This broader, more contextual definition of evidence in the implementation stage helps to explain why 
conventional approaches to getting evidence into practice, based largely on voluntary cooperation 
between individual researchers and policy makers at the organisational level – or even more formal 
‘systems guidance’ – may fail to result in evidence-based programme implementation. As noted earlier, 
decisions about resource allocation are fundamentally political decisions, and strategies aimed at 
maximising the use of evidence must not only acknowledge, but more importantly address, this political 
context, pushing policy debate – and the arguments for evidence – into a more public domain. 
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Humphreys and Piot (2012, 1) argue that few people, even scientists who value evidence highly, ‘would 
want to live in a society in which politicians completely ignored the view of those who have elected them 
as their representatives’. We are not arguing that evidence should always trump politics, nor that the 
final decisions on resource allocations should be made by content experts rather than elected policy 
makers. What we do feel is important however, is that informed opinion is considered, and transparently 
communicated, in every stage of the policy process and is not confined to confidential policy 
recommendations. 
We propose three separate, but complementary models of evidence incorporation. All three models 
acknowledge the importance of local institutional and political constraints on programme implementation 
choices. Like Sanderson (2010), we believe deliberative processes are the key, and each model is 
based on the fundamental principle of embedding independent and public review of the evidence as part 
of the decision-making processes. By independent, we mean free from political interference or influence. 
While elected politicians retain the final say in funding programmes, they must be provided with 
recommendations derived from expert assessment of evidence made at arm’s length from political 
processes. Public review will safeguard this independence, ensuring a transparent process for 
identifying and reviewing evidence. A political decision to disregard evidence-based recommendations 
would need to be publicly justified. 
The three models of evidence incorporation are based on different levels of expert influence and 
degrees of public involvement. Model 1 requires public review of the evidence by a group of content 
experts whose independence is guaranteed by law. Expert opinions are open to challenge by other 
experts familiar with the content field, and the justifications for accepting particular expert 
recommendations are made publicly available in a format understandable by the lay public. Model 2 
broadens participation to include public review of the evidence by experts and stakeholders without a 
legal privileging of designated experts. In this model all those with an established knowledge of, and 
interest in, the policy issue are able to contribute to the debate, and non-scientific expertise in practical 
matters may be of more importance here. Model 3 involves an even more inclusive citizen review of the 
evidence, with the role of public deliberation revolving around the lay person’s assessment of the 
relative worth of different policy options. 
Our framework draws on current arguments around budgetary processes, which claim that the policy 
paralysis of many democratic governments can be overcome by models of more inclusive and 
transparent policy making (Posner and Blöndel, 2011). Table 2 provides examples of the types of 
institutional structures we believe would be necessary to ensure more deliberative and evidence-based 
policy implementation under each model. 
It is important to note that our models do not represent rigid, preset solutions, but rather are illustrative 
of the type of deliberative institutional changes that policy bodies may wish to pilot and learn from 
(Sanderson, 2010; 2011). Different practice communities will develop their own local variants of these 
approaches according to their specific political and institutional contexts and their particular aims and 
perceived needs (Greenhalgh et al, 2011). 
Model 1: Statutory, independent, expert review of the evidence 
This first model is appropriate for very specific, technical and continuous areas of decision making, like 
pricing of pharmaceuticals. Under these circumstances, expertise is required to evaluate the clinical 
efficacy, cost-effectiveness or assessment of the benefits and harms of particular interventions, and this 
advice must be free from interference by stakeholders such as pharmaceutical companies. The 
Australian Pharmaceutical Benefits Advisory Committee (PBAC), whose functions, roles and 
responsibilities have been prescribed in legislation, is an exemplar of this model. 
The PBAC makes recommendations about which drugs should be added to the Pharmaceutical Benefits 
Scheme (PBS) which subsidises most of the cost of those medicines listed. No pharmaceutical may be 
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listed on the PBS without a positive recommendation from PBAC. Established with a legislative mandate 
that protects its independence from the government of the day, PBAC considers expert evidence on the 
comparative clinical performance and cost-effectiveness of nominated drugs (Salkeld, Mitchell, and Hill, 
1999). Its transparent processes include the provision of Public Summary Documents, available online, 
which present the rationale for its recommendations (Australian Government, 2007). 
Despite its legal foundations, the PBAC process has not been immune to political interference. For 
example, following intensive lobbying prior to the 2001 federal election, the Australian government 
decided to fund Herceptin, a breast cancer chemotherapy drug, under a special programme 
independent of the PBS, when PBAC had determined it was not cost-effective and had recommended 
against funding it (MacKenzie et al, 2008). In 2011 then federal health minister Nicola Roxon deferred 
indefinitely the listing of several drugs the PBAC had recommended for PBS listing, on the grounds that 
the Australian government, determined to return the national economy to surplus by 2013, could not 
afford to fund them (Dunleavy, 2011). 
Such challenges to the PBAC procedures are rare, and are most likely to occur when there is strong 
perceived public pressure to fund a particular drug or when the open-ended funding of cost-effective 
drugs clashes with the broader fiscal priorities of a national government. Yet these limitations of the 
PBAC system raise questions about the power of any single issue advisory body, even one with a 
legislative basis, to influence resource allocation decisions across the sector. The establishment of a 
broader based national public health advisory body – such as a Public Health Advisory Committee 
(PHAC) – may be more successful. This body could report directly to Parliament, rather than to the 
Minister for Health, and be granted parliamentary authority to access information previously not shared 
across departments, thus opening up scrutiny of the whole policy process including decisions around 
programme implementation. 
In the Australian case study, such a body would have enabled accurate costings of all election 
commitments, including those for bowel cancer screening. In the New Zealand situation, a PHAC would 
have brought the lack of leadership and planning for bowel cancer screening to the attention of the 
public, giving advocates more ammunition to argue for a quicker government response to the need to 
fund training of colonoscopists and the provision of more colonoscopy facillities. Similarly, the existence 
of such a body in the UK would have highlighted the inadequacy of the limited roll-out when compared 
with the evidence of potential benefits and cost-effectiveness of a full bowel cancer screening 
programme, and put pressure on the government to do more. 
Model 2: Independent and public review of the evidence by experts and stakeholders 
The second model involves independent and public review of the evidence, but without the legislative 
framework. Like Model 1, this model is also useful in circumstances where expertise is required to 
evaluate the clinical efficacy, cost-effectiveness and balance between potential benefits and harms of 
particular interventions. But it is also particularly valuable in situations where stakeholder views are 
important – for example, where governments are considering which model of service delivery is best for 
a particular location. In these situations, the practical experience of managers who have worked with the 
clients, and of the clients themselves, could be invaluable. 
Existing models of this kind are health sector based. Both the UK National Screening Committee (NSC) 
and the National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE) employ widespread stakeholder 
consultation and transparency of the decision making processes (Kelly et al, 2010). These bodies use 
deliberative processes to maximise the impact of evidence and their consultative and transparent 
approach makes it much more difficult for a government to reject those recommendations without 
providing a formal, publicly contestable justification. However, the involvement of both NICE and the 
NSC end once recommendations for policy have been made. 
11 |  P a g e
 
This model could potentially be strengthened to broaden its remit past the policy formulation stage to 
include involvement in policy design, including the provision of formal advice on resources and funding 
that would be required for adequate implementation. While elected officials in Australia (usually outside 
the health ministry, in departments such as Finance, Treasury or Prime Minister and Cabinet), will retain 
the final say over spending decisions through the Expenditure Review Committee process, experts and 
stakeholders are involved in the wider resource allocation decisions within the public health sector about 
where the best return on investment is likely to be. Discussion is no longer confined to the assessment 
of scientific evidence only, but outside views are also sought on issues of practical feasibility (can it work 
with the resources available?) and acceptability to the service providers and end users of the 
intervention. Representatives from advocacy and programme delivery organisations, who understand 
the nuances of the content area (be it mental health, aged care, and so on) would be given a seat at the 
table. Furthermore, these discussions are made publicly available so that all the factors that have been 
taken into account in making resource allocation decisions are transparent. Under our model, expert and 
stakeholder input is also continued in the policy implementation and evaluation stages. 
In the Australian case study, adoption of this model would have forced public disclosure of costings for 
the bowel cancer screening programme, allowing experts to correct these wildly inaccurate costings 
before budget allocation decisions had been made. The Howard government’s desire to honour election 
commitments, a pledge it took seriously, is likely to have been enough to revise allocations for a full 
screening programme prior to final acceptance by the Expenditure Review Committee. In the New 
Zealand case study, greater stakeholder involvement, including participation by Maori communities, may 
have helped to clarify the differing expectations of a screening programme and fast tracked the 
identification of the specific training and funding requirements for the politicians to consider. In the UK, 
more open and public discussion of the limitations of the existing bowel cancer screening programme 
may have put political pressure on the government to move more quickly to fully fund an evidence-
based programme. 
Model 3: Citizen review of the evidence 
The level of possible public involvement ranges from that confined to limited participation by individuals 
considered to be representative of the wider public, through to broader level mass participation. While it 
is not possible to involve all citizens in all decisions, more modest suggestions for introducing 
deliberative principles into the real world of decision making include restricting deliberation to elected 
representatives of parliament (Uhr, 1998); deliberative polling, consensus conferences and citizens’ 
juries (Parkinson, 2006); and mini-publics (Goodin and Dryzek, 2008). However, the problem with such 
limited deliberative processes is that they are likely to be confined to more local issues. A review of 
deliberative processes in the health and disability sector in the UK found that the major decisions 
remained ‘in the hands of senior politicians and policymakers’. Participants in deliberative forums only 
discussed minor details, or issues that were disconnected from real policy making (Parkinson, 2006, 
65). 
Although public pressure can work as an effective means of getting neglected, evidence-based policies 
onto the political agenda, there are no inherent properties associated with this model that restrict it to 
consideration of policies with strong evidence bases. Parkinson (2006, 167) argues that an active and 
informed public is essential in order to ‘challenge the status quo and bring new claims and new 
experiences to public attention’, but cautions that other institutional mechanisms are needed to 
incorporate evidence into the decision processes, so that decisions are not based purely on who can 
shout the loudest. 
Despite the limitations of deliberative processes, both governments and the public can benefit from 
broadening participation in policy making. For example, NICE has institutionalised public involvement in 
its decision-making processes, through its Citizens Council which meets twice yearly to provide ‘non-
binding input to NICE on issues identified by NICE but informed and shaped by council members’ 
(Abelson et al, 2007, 42). 
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In model 3, we propose that the full range of public deliberation (from limited local involvement to mass 
participation) is possible. Citizen review of the evidence could be achieved through the conventional 
means of formal committee membership, in addition to participation in deliberative fora such as citizens’ 
juries, and through broader public discussion of policy issues in the media. Different sources of citizen 
participation can support one another and help minimise the flaws of individual approaches. 
One strength of this model lies in the educative role transparent and public discussion of policy issues 
may have on the general public. Such public commentary on government decisions may have led to a 
more informed public, and some individuals, particularly those affected by bowel cancer, may have been 
willing to challenge the limited screening programmes in Australia and the UK, or the delayed 
introduction of a programme in New Zealand. 
CONCLUSION 
We have argued that even when the evidence translation literature has acknowledged the importance of 
institutional and political constraints on evidence-based implementation, it has not addressed these 
issues in its proposed models. 
The best chance of increasing the relative role of evidence in policy outcomes, we believe, lies in 
embedding the public review of evidence throughout all stages of the policy process. This can be 
achieved through the use of deliberative strategies within an institutional approach to: define the rules 
and processes of external, independent review of the evidence; influence how governments allocate 
adequate funding to implement these evidence-based proposals; and ensure the evidence-based 
programmes are implemented and evaluated in a transparent manner, informed by expert, stakeholder 
and general public views. 
Our proposed models of evidence incorporation provide examples of how these deliberative strategies 
could be included across all stages of the policy process. We acknowledge they may be implemented to 
varying extents and in different forms in diverse policy settings. Case study analyses, of different 
policies and within different governance structures, would be helpful to assess the utility of our 
speculative proposals for increasing the relative role of evidence in public health practice. 
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Table 2: Proposed examples of institutional procedures for increasing the use of evidence beyond the policy formation stage 
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